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A number of recent behavioral studies have shown that emotional expressions are
differently perceived depending on the race of a face, and that perception of race cues is
influenced by emotional expressions. However, neural processes related to the perception
of invariant cues that indicate the identity of a face (such as race) are often described
to proceed independently of processes related to the perception of cues that can vary
over time (such as emotion). Using a visual face adaptation paradigm, we tested whether
these behavioral interactions between emotion and race also reflect interdependent neural
representation of emotion and race. We compared visual emotion aftereffects when the
adapting face and ambiguous test face differed in race or not. Emotion aftereffects were
much smaller in different race (DR) trials than same race (SR) trials, indicating that the
neural representation of a facial expression is significantly different depending on whether
the emotional face is black or white. It thus seems that invariable cues such as race interact
with variable face cues such as emotion not just at a response level, but also at the level
of perception and neural representation.
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Faces contain a wealth of social information, conveying cues
about identity, personality, intentions, and emotions. It is, there-
fore, not surprising that social cues encoded by faces are extracted
quickly and efficiently (Mouchetant-Rostaing and Giard, 2003;
Blau et al., 2007; Ito and Bartholow, 2009).
A number of behavioral studies indicate that cues that are
used to establish the identity of a face, i.e., invariable cues about
face structure such as race and gender, influence the process-
ing of variable aspects of the face such as emotional expression.
Especially the representation of social category information about
race (an invariable facial feature) and the emotional expression of
the face (a variable facial feature) appear to be closely interlinked.
A number of recent studies have shown that emotional expres-
sions are perceived differently and more effectively depending on
the race of a face (Elfenbein and Ambady, 2003; Hugenberg and
Bodenhausen, 2003; Bestelmeyer et al., 2010; Bijlstra et al., 2010).
In addition, the perception and encoding of race cues can depend
on facial emotional expression (Hugenberg and Bodenhausen,
2004; Ackerman et al., 2006; Richeson and Trawalter, 2008).
Together, these studies suggest that perceptual cues related to the
race and emotion expression of a face are not processed inde-
pendently. Instead, an invariant feature such as race can alter the
perception of variable features such as emotional expressions, and
variable features such as emotional expressions can in turn change
the perception of invariant features such as the race of a face.
Although there is clear behavioral evidence that invariable
race cues and variable emotion cues are processed interdepen-
dently, there is very little evidence of interactive processing of
emotion and race cues at a neurological level. On the con-
trary, influential cognitive and neuroscientific models of face
perception assert that invariable cues such as race and gender are
processed independently from variable facial cues such as emo-
tional expression and gaze direction (Bruce and Young, 1986;
Haxby et al., 2000). Studies that directly looked at brain processes
involved in the perception of emotion and social categories show
clear evidence of independent and parallel processing of the two.
For example, Kubota and Ito (2007) showed subjects black and
white faces with a range of emotional expressions. The Event-
related Potentials (ERPs) evoked by these different faces showed
that specific race- and emotion-related components both emerge
early but proceed in parallel, showing no reliable interactions.
Similarly, several brain imaging studies have shown that the
processing of social category information of a face engages dif-
ferent brain areas than regions involved in processing emotion-
related information, again suggesting independence. In general,
face processing consistently activates the (right or bilateral) lat-
eral fusiform gyrus, also referred to as the fusiform face area,
and the superior temporal sulcus (Kanwisher et al., 1997; Halgren
et al., 1999). However, these two regions seem to be independently
engaged in processing variable and invariable face cues. Invariable
face cues, such as those related to the identity of the face, engage
the fusiform face area. Processing of variable face cues, such as
those related to emotion or eye gaze, engage the superior temporal
sulcus (Hoffman and Haxby, 2000). Lesion studies show the same
pattern of results (Humphreys et al., 1993). These studies thus
strongly indicate that brain processes underlying the perception
of race and emotion proceed independently.
Taken together, the current pattern of results is inconsistent
at best. On the one hand, human behavior shows that the pro-
cessing and representation of facial emotion and race are likely
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interlinked. On the other hand, studies directly measuring brain
processes that underlie emotion and race perception suggest
independent processing of these two types of information.
There are several ways to explain such an inconsistency. One
possibility is thatthebrainrepresentsvariablecues likeemotionand
invariable cues like race independently, as reflected by the imaging
and ERP findings, and that subsequent behavioral interactions
purely take place at the stage of response preparation, or execution.
However, it is also possible that, while the initial processing of
emotion- and race-related facial cues is truly independent, as
is shown by the multitude of imaging studies, these processing
streams interact at some point (possibly at the amygdala, see
also Haxby et al., 2002) leading to final interdependent neural
representations of emotion and social category as observed in
behavioral studies. The key difference between these explanations
is thus whether or not the neural representation of emotional
expressions changes with the race of the face (and vice versa).
In two experiments, we tested whether identical emotional
expressions, expressed by faces with different races (DRs) rely
on the same, or on different perceptual representations in the
brain. This was tested using a visual adaptation paradigm. Visual
adaptation to a face with specific characteristics influences subse-
quent perception of faces with similar characteristics, notably by
diminishing perception of the characteristics of the test face that
match the adapting face. For example, after viewing an explic-
itly angry face, subsequent ambiguous “angry-frightened” faces
appear relatively less angry and more frightened (Webster et al.,
2004). These face adaptation effects seem to rely on adjustments
of relatively high-level representations of different facial features
and cues, since the aftereffects are not sensitive to changes in size,
orientation, or position (Watson and Clifford, 2003).
Adaptation tasks such as these are specifically suitable to test
whether informationaboutsocial categoriesandemotionalexpres-
sions are neurally independent or not. If emotion is represented
independently of social categories such as race, then black and
white faces expressing the same emotion should engage identical
neural substrates, resulting in similar aftereffects for emotional
expressions independent of whether the first “adapting” face and
the second “test” face are from the same or different racial cate-
gories.On theotherhand, if theunderlyingmental representations
of emotional expressions differ to some extent as a function of
race, then the emotion aftereffect should be diminished or absent
when the adapting and test faces differ in race.
Although visual aftereffects such as the emotion aftereffect are
behavioral measures, their occurrence provide direct information
about the neural representations that underlie our perception.
The psychophysical aspects of the aftereffect thus allows us to
test whether emotional expressions are represented independently
of invariable facial cues, or whether the neural representations
of emotions are influenced by perceived social categories such
as race.
EXPERIMENT 1
In experiment 1 we used visual aftereffects to measure the level
of overlap in the neural representation of emotions expressed
by black and white faces. In different blocks, the relationship
between the adapting face and the test faces was varied. In the
Same Race/Same Identity (SR/SI) condition, the test face and the
adapting face had the same identity and thus the same race (SR) as
well. In the Different Race/Different Identity (DR/DI) condition,
adapting faces had a DR, and thus a different identity than the
test faces. DR/DI and SR/SI trials do not only differ in the racial
(dis)similarity between the adapting and test faces, but also in
the absence or presence of identity differences between the adapt-
ing and test face. This introduces additional differences between
the adapting and test face than just racial features, which could
account for any decrease or even absence of emotion adaptation
(Wu et al., 2009). To test how much of the difference in emotion
aftereffects between DR/DI and SR/SI trials can be attributed to
these differences in identity and background facial features (and
thus not to differences in race) we added a Same Race/Different
Identity (SR/DI) condition. In the SR/DI trials, the adapting and
test faces were of the SR, but had different identities. Therefore, if
any differential effects observed in the DR/DI condition are due
to differences in identity and/or background features, these same
differential effects should also be present in the SR/DI condition.
If the decrease or absence of adaptation in the DR/DI condition
is due to differences in race, these effects should not be present
in the SR/DI condition. Figure 1 shows example trials for each of
the three conditions.
METHODS
Participants
Twenty-two participants participated in Experiment 1. The aver-
age age was 20 years, and 16 of them were women. Of the 22
participants, two were African-American, nine were European-
American, one was Hispanic, one was Middle Eastern, and nine
were Asian.
Stimuli
The faces that functioned as adapting and test stimuli were created
using Facegen Software. All stimuli were based on four different
identities, two white males and two black males. For each iden-
tity a 100% angry and a 100% frightened face was generated to
function as the adapting stimulus. In addition 13 test faces were
generated. These test faces had an ambiguous expression, rang-
ing from 20% angry/80% afraid to 80% angry/20% afraid in 5%
increments. When presented on the screen, the faces had a height
of approximately 10 cm, and a width of about 5.5 cm.
Procedure
At the start of the experiment, each participant was randomly
assigned one black and one white identity which would function
as the identity of the test faces throughout the experiment.
After subjects had read and signed the informed consent, the
experiment started with a practice block, in which subjects viewed
and categorized just the ambiguous test faces. The practice block
consisted of 104 trials, with four repeats for each of the 26 dif-
ferent test faces that were used for that participant. Each face was
centrally presented for 300ms, and was followed by a response
screen that consisted of a centrally presented question mark, and
the words AFRAID and ANGRY at the bottom of the screen, at
the right and left hand corner. Subjects responded using the “a”
key (left hand button press for a frightened face) or the “l” key
(right hand button press for an angry face).
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FIGURE 1 | Examples of the three different trial types used in Experiment 1 and 2 (faces were identical to experiment 1, but presented in gray scale).
Adaptation trials consisted of a 5 s adaptation period in which
subjects viewed an angry or a frightened face. The adapting face
was followed by a 50ms pattern mask, after which an ambiguous
test face was presented for 300ms. Participants were then asked
to indicate whether this ambiguous test face had an angry or a
frightened expression with a left or right-hand button press using
the same response screen as in the practice trials.
The relationship between the adapting and test faces differed
over blocks. In the SR/SI block, the adapting face had the same
identity as the test face. In the SR/DI block the adapting and test
face were always different people, but with the SR. Therefore, in
both the SR/SI and the SR/DI block, a black adapting face was
always followed by a black test face, and a white adapting face
was always followed by a white test face. In the DR/DI block the
adapting and test face were always of a DR, and, therefore, also
of a different identity, such that a black adapting face was always
followed by a white test face and a white adapting face was always
followed by a black test face.
Subjects completed three blocks, each consisting of 52 trials
[13 ambiguous faces, two identities (1 black and 1 white test
identity) and two emotions (angry and afraid adapting face)]. The
order in which the three experimental blocks were presented was
randomized over subjects.
Analysis
For each of the three conditions, SI/SR, DI/SR, and DI/DR, the
percentage of “frightened” responses was calculated for the two
adapting emotions. The difference between the proportion of
“frightened” responses following angry vs. frightened adapting
faces was taken to indicate the magnitude of the emotion after-
effect. An ANOVA with the factors Adapting Emotion (angry
vs. frightened) and Adaptation Condition (SI/SR, DI/SR, and
DI/DR) tested for differences in the magnitude of the emotion
aftereffect between the three adaptation conditions. In case of a
significant interactionbetweenAdaptingEmotionandAdaptation
Condition Post-hoc t-tests were performed to test the nature that
interaction. F-tests with more than one degree of freedom in the
numerator were adjusted by means of the Greenhouse–Geisser or
Huynh–Feldt correction where appropriate. Uncorrected degrees
of freedom and corrected p-values are reported.
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RESULTS
After seeing an angry adapting face, subjects judged subsequent
ambiguous test faces to be more afraid, whereas adaptation to
a frightened face made subsequent ambiguous faces seem more
angry [F(1,21) = 260.7, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.93]. Crucially,
as Figure 2 shows, this emotion aftereffect was moderated by
the relationship between the adapting and ambiguous test face
[F(2,42) = 4.4, p = 0.02, partial η2 = 0.18]. Post-hoc t-tests
showed that the emotion aftereffect was smaller in DI/DR trials
compared to both the SI/SR [t(21) = 3.1, p = 0.005, Cohen’s d =
0.96] and DI/SR trials[t(21) = 2.2, p = 0.04, Cohen’s d = 0.67].
The emotion aftereffect was comparable in size for SI/SR and
DI/SR trials [t(21) = 0.6, p = 0.58, Cohen’s d = 0.17]. Thus, a
switch in race between the adapting and the test face significantly
reduces the emotion aftereffect. In addition, this reduction in the
size of the aftereffect cannot be attributed to the simple difference
in identity (which accompanies the difference in race) between
the adapting and test face, since a difference in identity alone does
not lead to a similar decrease of the aftereffect.
EXPERIMENT 2
The faces in Experiment 1 were presented in color, and the color
transition within DR trials (white adapting to black test face,
or black adapting to white test face) was obviously larger than
within SR trials. It could thus be that the reduction of the after-
effect is simply due to the difference in color of the faces, and
not due to the difference in race in itself. In addition, the rela-
tionship between the adapting and test face was held constant
within each block. This blocked presentation could have allowed
participants to adopt different response strategies for the differ-
ent types of trials. Experiment 2 was conducted to replicate the
results of Experiment 1 while removing these two possible con-
founds. In Experiment 2 subjects viewed the same stimuli as in
Experiment 1. However, the stimuli were presented in gray scale,
so that a race-switch between the adapting and test face within
FIGURE 2 | Average emotion aftereffects, calculated as the difference
between the proportion of ambiguous test-faces categorized as afraid
following an angry adapting and a frightened adapting face, for the
three different combinations of adapting and test face (Same
Identity/Same Race, Different Identity/Same Race and Different
Identity/Different Race).
a trial did not provoke a difference in coloring between the two
faces. In addition the different conditions (SI/SR, DI/SR, DI/DR)
were mixed within blocks, so that participants could not build an
expectation about the type of test face that would encounter.
METHODS
Participants
Twenty-four participants (average age of 21.8 years, 15 women)
participated in Experiment 2. Of these 24 participants one
was African-American, 17 were European-American, three were
Hispanic, one was Middle Eastern, and two were Asian.
Stimuli
The faces used in Experiment 1 were altered to gray scale images
using Adobe Photoshop. In all other regards, the stimuli in
Experiment 1 and 2 were identical.
Procedure
The set-up was similar to Experiment 1, except that the three
different adaptation conditions (SI/SR, DI/SR, and DI/DR) were
presented randomly intermixed, divided in three blocks of 52
trials.
Analysis
The data were analyzed in the same way as in Experiment 1.
RESULTS
As before, subjects showed a strong emotion aftereffect
[F(1,23) = 193.1, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.89], which was again
moderated by the relationship between the adapting and test face
[F(2,40) = 3.9, p = 0.04, partial η2 = 0.14]. The aftereffect was
smaller in DI/DR trials compared to both the SI/SR [t(23) =
2.1, p = 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.65] and DI/SR trials [t(23) = 2.2,
p = 0.04, Cohen’s d = 0.60], whereas the aftereffect for SI/SR
and DI/SR trials was comparable [t(23) = 0.5, p = 0.60, Cohen’s
d = 0.15], see Figure 3. Once more, these results show that a
switch in race between the adapting and test face reduces the mag-
nitude of the aftereffect, and this effect cannot be explained by a
difference in face identity.
FIGURE 3 | Average emotion aftereffects for the three different
combinations of adapting and test face (Same Identity/Same Race,
Different Identity/Same Race, and Different Identity/Different Race)
when the adapting and test faces were presented in gray scale.
Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org February 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 9 | 4
Otten and Banaji Race changes the representation of emotion
DISCUSSION
These results provide an important indication that variable facial
features such as emotional expression and invariable facial fea-
tures such as social category are jointly processed. After adapting
to a white face, subjects showed a smaller emotion aftereffect if
the ambiguous test face was black (DR) than when the test face
was white (SR). When the adapting and test face only differed in
identity and not in race, aftereffects were comparable to trials in
which the adapting face and the test faces had the same iden-
tity. This indicates that the neural representations of emotions
expressed by white faces differ from the neural representations
for the same emotions expressed by black faces. In addition, this
difference in representation is not a consequence of differences in
identity.
It thus seems that there is indeed a neural basis for the behav-
ioral research showing that perception of variable cues like race
is influenced by emotional expression and vice versa (Elfenbein
and Ambady, 2003; Hugenberg and Bodenhausen, 2003, 2004;
Ackerman et al., 2006; Richeson and Trawalter, 2008). Kubota
and Ito (2007) have argued that the interdependence of race
and emotion in these behavioral tasks only occurred because
the stimuli were ambiguous in nature. In the current experi-
ments, the test faces were indeed ambiguous in nature. However,
it seems highly unlikely that the observed differences between
the adaptation conditions are due to the ambiguity in the test
faces. The observed effects hinge on the processing and adapta-
tion of the adapting faces, and those faces were not ambiguous
in race cues or emotion cues. In addition, participants were not
required to respond to, or engage with the adapting faces in
any way other than to just watch them for 5 s. It thus seems
unlikely that participants employed specific strategies to deal
with ambiguous faces when they processed the adaptive faces.
In addition, many of the tasks that show behavioral interactions
between emotion and race in face perception have used natu-
ral, unambiguous faces (Elfenbein and Ambady, 2003; Ackerman
et al., 2006; Richeson and Trawalter, 2008). Taken together, the
present and previous studies strongly suggest that emotion and
social category information like race are jointly processed, and
that the interactions at the behavioral level have their roots in
the interdependent neural representation of race and emotional
expressions.
These data furthermore suggest that the encoding of variable
and invariable facial cues is more interconnected than has been
assumed. Even though previous findings suggest that racial and
emotional cues are processed independently (Bruce and Young,
1986; Haxby et al., 2000), at least in early neural processing stages
(Kubota and Ito, 2007), the current results indicate that neural
representation of a face not only integrates variable and invariable
cues such as race and emotion, but that the neural representations
of facial expressions are significantly altered depending on the
race of the face. This strongly suggests that race and emotion are
processed interdependently. This corroborates a recent theoreti-
cal model of person perception by Freeman and Ambady (2011)
which proposes that the perception of other people relies on
an interplay of lower-level sensory perception and higher-order
social cognition.
However, currently there are no studies (as far as we are aware)
that provide evidence where in the brain the processing of emo-
tion and race comes together. Previous research indicates that the
neural mechanism that supports the integration of information
about race and emotion does not appear to be cortical (Kubota
and Ito, 2007). This suggests that subcortical structures, such as
the amygdala, are a more likely site for the neural integration
of race and emotion. It is well documented that the amygdala
plays an important role in the processing of emotions, especially
fear (Morris et al., 1996, 1998; Phelps, 2006). In addition, the
amygdala is also implied in the processing of race cues in faces
(Golby et al., 2001; Phelps et al., 2000). The fact that the pathways
that underlie emotion and race processing cross at the amygdala
provide suggestive evidence that the interaction between race-
and emotion-related perceptual processes could take place here.
Future brain-imaging studies will hopefully shed more light on
the actual brain-structures that underlie the interaction between
variable and invariable cues in face processing.
CONCLUSION
The race of the people around us has been previously shown to
influence many socially relevant processes. The current findings
indicate that race is indeed such a fundamental perceptual cue
that it changes the basic perception of emotional facial expres-
sions, which is in itself a highly relevant social cue. These results
specifically show that racial cues exert their influence at a neu-
ral level, shaping the actual representation and perception of
the emotion, and not just the subsequent interpretation of that
emotion.
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